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Liberation, Not Independence:
A Practical Theological Paradigm for 
People in Scotland1
Eric Stoddart
Introduction
	
‘There	shall	be	a	Scottish	Parliament’	is	the	simple,	direct	statement	
that	begins	the Scotland	Act	1998	and	was	realized	(again)	when	the	
parliament	was	formally	opened	by	HM	The	Queen	on	1	July	1999.2	
The	Scottish	National	Party	secured	47	seats	to	Labour’s	46	in	the	May	
2007 Scottish Parliamentary Election and became, for the first time, the 
largest	party.	The	SNP	manifesto	commitment	to	provide	a	referendum	
by	which	people	in	Scotland	could	express	their	view	on	independence	
during	this	current	parliament	has	placed	the	constitutional	question	
for	the	United	Kingdom	squarely	on	the	table.	Although	the	proposed	
date	of	the	referendum	has	not	been	published	the	question	has	been	
crafted	so	as	to	fall	within	the	competency	of	the	parliament.	Voters	
in	Scotland	will	be	asked	whether	or	not	 ‘the	Scottish	Government	
should	 negotiate	 a	 settlement	 with	 the	 Government	 of	 the	 United	
Kingdom	so	that	Scotland	becomes	an	independent	state.’3
The Nationalists previously affirmed their hope of being ‘Free 
by ’93’; a declaration that still has a frisson that will probably elude 
future	 slogans	 for	 independence.	 ‘Self-driven	 by	 2011’,	 should	
such	branding	ever	be	adopted	by	the	SNP,	does	not	carry	quite	the	
same	punch.	Nevertheless,	at	 the	core	of	 the	nationalist	agenda	 lies	
the	 goal	 of	 self-determination;	 independence	 from	 Westminster’s	
control.	 Knowing	 how	 The Scottish Constitutional Convention	 (an	
association	of	civic	and	political	groups,	 including,	amongst	others,	
churches,	local	authorities,	trades	unions	and	some	political	parties)	
had been influential in nurturing aspirations for devolution in the late 
1980s	until	the	1998	Act,	and	how	much	it	had	contributed	to	framing	
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that	legislation,	the	SNP	launched	its	own	National Conversation	in	
August	2007.	
Gordon	 Brown	 had	 published	 a	 Green	 Paper,	 The Governance 
of Britain,	 in	 the	 previous	 July	 but,	 to	 no-one’s	 surprise,	 had	 ruled	
independence	out	of	any	constitutional	revision.4	As	a	unionist	response	
to	the	SNP’s	Conversation,	the	Scottish	Parliament	voted	in	December	
2007	to	establish	an	independently-chaired	commission	to	review	the	
experience	of	devolution.	The	Calman	Commission	(so-named	after	
its	chairman,	Sir	Kenneth	Calman)	includes	Labour,	Liberal	Democrat	
and	Conservative	politicians	alongside	people	from	civil	society,	all	
whom	serve	in	a	personal	capacity.5	The	Calman	Commission	expects	
to make its final report later in 2009 but there is no formal end-point 
for	the	National Conversation.	
Revisions	to	the	constitutional	settlement	of	the	United	Kingdom	
continue	 to	 be	 framed	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 independence-devolution	
continuum.	 The	 SNP	 consultation	 document	 “Choosing	 Scotland’s	
Future” carries the motto on its cover: ‘Independence and responsibility 
in	the	modern	world’.6	Through	my	engagement	with	Manuel	Castells’	
theory	 of	 the	 network-state	 it	 is	my	 view	 that	 the	SNP	perspective	
fails	to	understand	the	‘modern’	world.	In	this	paper	I	will	interrogate	
‘independence’ and find it wanting politically and, through John Paul 
II’s	personalism	and	Jürgen	Moltmann’s	liberative	Christology,	I	will	
show	how	it	is	ethically	and	theologically	inadequate,	even	although	
it	is	wedded	to	‘responsibility’	in	the	SNP’s	proposal.	I	will	argue	that,	
instead,	‘liberation’	will	serve	us	much	better	as	a	paradigm	in	which	
to	frame	the	future	for	people	in	Scotland.	
My argument has affinity with Will Storrar’s attempt in his 1993 
PhD	 thesis	 to	 articulate	 (and	 recognize)	 a	move	 from	 a	 contextual	
theology	 of	 identity	 to	 one	 of	 liberation.7	 It	 was	 national	 identity,	
often	in	terms	of	nationhood,	that	had	occupied	Storrar	in	his	earlier	
book.8	However,	he	later	concluded	that	liberation	was	required	from	
not	merely	the	‘imprisoning	structures	of	the	British	state’	but	from	
social	and	cultural	structures,	especially	those	that	restricted	women	
in	Scotland.9 Some fifteen or so years on from Storrar’s PhD, I develop 
a	critique	of	independence	from	different	directions.
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T Political	inadequacy	
Manuel	Castells,	a	Spanish	sociologist,	is	most	widely	known	for	his	
work	on	 the	global	cultural	and	political	dimensions	of	 information	
networks.10	Castells	has	argued	that	the	development	of	information	
technology	has	ushered	in	a	revolution	that	has	altered	the	paradigm	
through	which	we	are	to	understand	economy,	society	and	culture.11	
This,	he	contends,	has	had	profound	effects	on	the	nation-state	that	is	
losing power, although not influence.12	Sources	of	authority	and	power	
have	multiplied	since	the	1970s	as	governments	now	have	to	contend	
with	 a	 transnational	 core	 to	 national	 economies,	 namely	 global	
financial markets, transnationalization of production, and production 
and	trade	networks.	The	nation-state:
…	has	 lost	most	 of	 its	 sovereign	 economic	 power,	 although	
it	still	has	some	regulatory	capacity	and	relative	control	over	
its	 subjects.	Yet	 it	 retains	 its	 capacity	 as	 a	 strategic	 actor	 to	
act	 upon	 the	 conditions	 that	 underlie	 the	 performance	 of	 its	
economy.	This	requires	that	the	state	becomes	interdependent	
within	 a	 broader	 network	 of	 economic	 processes	 out	 of	 its	
control.13
The	 new	 paradigm	 is	 the	 network	 of	 inter-connected	 nodes	 rather	
than	 linear	 linkages	 in	 hierarchies	 or	 ‘managing	 centres’.14	Nation-
states	are	nodes,	but	not	necessarily	the	most	powerful.	They	share	the	
network	with	other	sources	of	authority	and	power,	many	of	which	are	
‘undefined, and, sometimes, indefinable’.15	These	include	networks	of	
capital and production but also include highly significant networks 
of	 communication,	 crime,	 international	 organizations,	 transnational	
religions,	 movements	 of	 public	 opinion	 and	 all	 kinds	 of	 social	
movements.16
In	 Scottish	 terms,	 the	 take-over	 of	 HBOS	 by	 Lloyds	 TSB	 is	 a	
good	example	of	the	response	to	networks	of	power	that	are	restricted	
(although	not	of	course	wholly	neutered)	on	the	part	of	both	national	
and	 devolved	 governments.17 Similarly, people-trafficking whether 
for	the	sex	industry,	domestic	or	agricultural	labour	is	facilitated	(but	
also	combated)	by	international	networks.18	It	 is	not	merely	that	the	
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trafficking is organized by networks of criminals who can make use 
of	 information	 technology	but	 that	 the	practice	 is	 embedded	within	
a	 global	 political	 and	 economic	 system	 which	 is	 itself	 a	 network.	
Although much recent focus has been on financial networks, Castells 
work draws our attention to the flows of power where some nodes 
(and	sub-networks)	are	cultural	whilst	others	are	political.	
Castells’	 claim	 for	 a	 new	 paradigm	 is	 of	 course	 contested.	
He	 is	 accused	 of	 ignoring	 the	 ‘traditional	 underpinning’	 of	 many	
successful	 web-based	 business-to-business	 dealings,19	 or	 an	 almost	
‘anthropocentric approach’ to the financial networks,20	of	prematurely	
relegating	civil	society	‘to	the	dustbin	of	history’21	and	of	fetishizing	
information	and	information	technology	in	his	reductionism.22	Most	
important	 is	 Frank	Webster’s	 critique	 that,	 like	 others,	Castells	 too	
readily identifies discontinuities	 with	 previous	 forms	 of	 social	
organization	and	neglects	historical	continuities.23
Whilst	 I	 agree	 that	 Castells	 is	 stretching	 it	 to	 talk	 of	 network	
replacing	 linearity	 or	 managing-centre	 as	 a	 paradigm	 there	 is	 no	
doubt	that	he	is	describing	how	the	rules	of	the	game	have	changed	
very significantly given the development of information technologies. 
What	 concerns	 us	 more	 immediately	 in	 our	 discussion	 is	 how	 the	
traditional	 political	 language	 of	 ‘independence’	 lies	 within	 the	
old	 linear	 or	 managing-centre	 model.	 An	 agenda	 of	 political	 and	
economic	independence	from,	in	our	case,	Westminster,	had	perhaps	
some	saliency	in	the	1950s	and	1960s	(although	its	political	popularity	
was	 low	 prior	 to	Winnie	 Ewing	 winning	 the	 Hamilton	 by-election	
in	 1967).	 However,	 independence	 seems	 at	 odds	 with	 the	 realities	
of	 globalization	 in	 which	 the	 paradigm	 of	 networks	 (created	 and	
sustained	by	information	technologies)	are	integral.24
“Choosing Scotland’s Future” turns on its assertion that, ‘The 
people	of	Scotland	remain	sovereign’.25	Whilst	 there	is	a	nod	in	the	
direction	of	‘pooling	sovereignty’26	in	terms	of	both	the	EU	and	the	
UK,	the	document	singularly	fails	to	set	‘sovereignty’	in	the	context	
of	 the	 21st	 century.	The	 ‘modern	world’	 of	 the	motto	 is	 really	 ‘the	
world	until	 the	 third	quarter	of	 the	20th	century’.	This	 form	of	self-
determination	 is	 politically	 inadequate	 for	 the	 exigencies	 that	 face	
people	 in	Scotland	because	 to	be	 ‘independent’	within	a	network	 is	
nonsense.27	
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Ethical	inadequacy
	
But	is	this	the	criterion	by	which	we	are	to	rate	‘independence’?	I	have	
suggested	that	it	is	not	politically	expedient	given	the	changing	nature	
of	 society,	 particularly	 in	 terms	 of	 global	 politics	 and	 economics.	
What	are	the	grounds	upon	which	we	might	reach	a	decision	regarding	
its	ethical	value?	To	attempt	an	answer	I	turn	to	John	Paul	II	and	his	
personalist	 philosophy.	 In	many	ways	 I	want	 to	 treat	 independence	
in	 a	 similar	way	 to	 the	 former	Pope’s	 consideration	of	work	 in	 his	
encyclical	Laborem exercens.	
In	Laborem exercens John Paul II finds the ethical value of work 
to	 lie	 primarily	 in	 the	 subjective,	 rather	 than	 objective,	 dimension.	
We	classify	types	of	work	objectively	when	we	rate	them	as	perhaps	
menial,	 as	 ‘service’,	 or	 ‘alienating’	 whilst	 to	 other	 activities	 we	
give	 greater	 honour	 such	 as	 those	 contributing	 to	 knowledge,	 to	
theoretical	developments,	to	wealth-creation	or	any	number	of	other	
classifications. John Paul acknowledges that this is necessary but 
contends	that	these	rankings	not	be	given	primary	place	in	our	ethical	
evaluation	of	work.	 Instead	of	considering	 the	work	done	we	must,	
he	argues,	give	primacy	to	the	subject	of	work	–	to	the	person	who	
works.	The	ethical	nature	of	work	 is	 to	be	derived	 from	 the	person	
who,	through	work,	manifests	him-	or	herself	as	an	acting	subject.28
Within	this	personalist	standpoint	John	Paul	is	offering	us	a	way	
to	think	about	the	ethical	value	of	actions	per se.	It	is	in	acting	that	
a person both reveals and fulfils herself, her ‘appropriate structure 
of	 self-governance	 and	 self-possession	 is	 manifested’.29	 This	 must	
not	 be	mistaken	 for	 individualism	which	 sees	 the	 individual	 as	 the	
‘supreme	 and	 fundamental	 good’;30	 it	 is,	 rather,	 an	 eschewal	 of	 the	
abstract	 in	 favour	of	 the	 concrete	 ‘acting-person’	 and	 a	 recognition	
that it is together with others that we reach our fulfillment. Our 
‘participation’	with	 others	 is	 always	 as	 an	 acting-person;	 any	 other	
form	of	collaboration	 is	merely	doing	 things	 together	 (whether	 that	
be freely chosen or under the influence of powerful voices or mass 
psychology).	 This	 personalist	 approach	 requires	 that	 we	 carefully	
consider	 how	 we	 use	 terms	 such	 as	 ‘community’	 or	 ‘compatriots’	
because	 these	 too	 easily	 are	 taken	 to	 refer	 to	what	 John	 Paul	 calls	
‘communities	of	being’,	especially	should	they	share	exclusive	traits.	
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Personalism demands that we think first of ‘communities of acting’ 
because membership in ‘communities of being’ is not to be identified 
with	authentic	‘participation’.31
If	we	return	to	national	independence	–	we	must	locate	its	ethical	
value	in	who	is	doing	independence.32	The	apparently	obvious	answer	
to	this	is	‘the	Scottish	people’	but,	even	if	we	can	agree	on	the	political	
qualifications for inclusion in that group, this is ethically problematic. 
‘The	Scottish	people’	are	mistakenly	attributed	with	what	John	Paul	
II,	 in	 other	 contexts,	 calls	 ‘a	 quasi-subjectiveness’.33	 It	 is	mistaken	
because	whilst	they	are	people	exercising	a	common	action	(of	sorts),	
‘the	Scottish	people’	 is	not	a	new	subject	of	acting.	Although	being	
and	 acting	 are	 realized	 together	with	others	 it	 is	 the	persons-acting	
who	are	always	its	proper	subject.
It	follows,	therefore,	that	we	look	for	the	ethical	value	of	Scottish	
independence	in	acting	of	persons-in-Scotland.	It	is	always	the	acting-
person	who	is	the	purpose	of	Scottish	independence.	To	what	extent	
does	 national	 independence	 contribute	 towards	 authentic	 human	
fulfillment understood in terms of participation?34 That fulfillment 
may	include	a	sense	of	national	social,	cultural	and	political	identity	
but	it	is	not	coterminous	with	it.	Scottish	independence	might,	despite	
my	concerns	about	its	political	inadequacy,	work	quite	well	on its own 
terms	but	my	contention	is	that	such	terms	are	ethically	inadequate.	
Theological	inadequacy	
Whilst	 I	 in	 no	way	wish	 to	 suggest	 that	 John	 Paul	 II’s	 personalist	
philosophy	 is	 not	 profoundly	 theological,	 I	 believe	we	 can	 still	 go	
further	in	our	critique	of	independence	by	taking	the	route	of	Jürgen	
Moltmann’s	liberative	Christology.
Ian	 Bradley	 has	 recently	 argued	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 1707	Act	 of	
Union	between	Scotland	and	England	from	a	Trinitarian	perspective	
that	draws	on	the	theme	of	perichoresis.35	I	wish	to	adopt	a	distinct,	
but	complementary	approach.	Moltmann	has	invited	us	to	frame	our	
theological reflections from the centre – that being the resurrection 
of the crucified Christ and the cross of the risen Christ.36	He	attempts	
to draw out the consequences of the theology of the crucified God 
for	anthropology,	translating	it,	as	examples,	into	psychological	and	
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political	 liberation.	Moltmann	 asks	 ‘who	 is	man	 in	 the	 face	 of	 the	
rejected	Son	of	Man	who	was	raised	up	in	the	freedom	of	God?’37	I	
want	to	ask	this	same	question	of	Scottish	independence	movements.
Importantly,	I	do	not	wish	to	address	‘nationalism’	or	‘nationalist	
movements’	 in	 the	 abstract	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 reaching	 generalisable	
conclusions	 that	 would	 speak	 to	 every	 ‘nationalism’	 ripped	 out	 of	
its	context.	 It	 is	not	my	 intention	 to	 rule	out	national	 independence	
as	 a	 theologically	 valid	 response	 in	 any	 and	 all	 circumstances.	 For	
example,	Africans’	independence	from	colonial	control	or	the	Baltic	
states	 breaking	 free	 from	 the	Soviet	Union	 each	 require	 evaluation	
within	 their	 own	 context.	 The	 historical	 and	 cultural	 particularities	
in	which	we	 face	 the	question	of	Scottish	national	 independence	 is	
that	of	 shortly	being	asked	 to	express	our	view	on	moving	 towards	
an	 independence	referendum,	possibly	within	 the	next	 three	or	 four	
years. My anchoring of the discussion here within a specific context is 
directly	related	to	the	personalist	approach	expounded	in	the	previous	
section.	We	 locate	 the	 ethical	 value	 of	 independence	 in	 the	 acting-
person	and	therefore	we	must	not	avoid	the	concrete	realities	of	what	
doing	 independence	means	 in	 2009,	 2010	 or	 2011	 –	whenever	 the	
promised	referendum	is	held.	This	reasoning	further	demands	that	we	
consider	our	partners	 in	 the	United	Kingdom	(from	whom	the	SNP	
wish	 to	 be	 ‘independent’)	 as	who	 they	 are	now,	 not	 as	 generalized	
‘English’	constructed	 from	mythical	 relationships	between	Scotland	
and	England	in	either	the	distant	or	more	recent	past.38	
The crucified God challenges us to reject the priority given to 
‘identity’	in	discussions	about	Scottish	independence	and	nationalism	
in favour of giving first place to ‘freedom’. This is the freedom of 
God	in	history	–	what	Moltmann	calls	the	‘transformations	of	God’,39	
‘anticipations’40	or	‘praesentia	explosiva’.41	This	is	not	a	freedom	to	
construct	any	particular	identity	(whether	Scottish,	British	or	anything	
else).	 Such	 a	 hermeneutic	 relativizes	 all	 discussions	 about	 political	
structure	 to	 questions	of	 ‘freedom’.	This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 national	
identity	can	never	be	an	‘anticipation’	–	but	only	if	it	is	necessary	for	
specific liberation (of a kind that I will consider below).
Even	 then	 we	 must	 be	 especially	 careful	 of	 national	 identity	
because	it	is	predicated	on	autonomy	and	self-determination	within	a	
framework	of	the	power	of	the	state,	of	management	and	of	linearity	
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(rather	 than	 network).	National	 identity	 is	 apiece	with	 notions	 that	
‘everyone	 is	 for	 everyone	 else	 merely	 the	 limitation	 of	 his	 own	
freedom’	as	Moltmann	critiques	effectively	in	his	The Trinity and the 
Kingdom of God.42
A theology of the man-God who was a Jew crucified by Romans, 
also	questions	the	importance	we	give	to	an	imagined	identity	which	
we	like	to	label	as	‘national’	but	which	is	usually	a	condensation	of	
myths	and	lesser	narratives,	and	a	sometimes	grudging	compromise	
between	numerous	sub-national	identities.	In	other	words,	‘Scottish’	
is	 a	 coalition	 of	 identities	 that	 we	 observe	 in	 its	 effervescence	
only.43	 Furthermore,	 these	 sub-themes	 of	 national	 identity	may	 not	
be	 the	 primary identity	 for	 many	 people.	 Being	 ‘Scottish’	 is	 only	
relatively	important	when	we	are	invited	to	choose	between	national	
identities.	Being	a	woman,	a	 father,	a	child,	middle-class,	working-
class,	unemployed	could	easily	be	 the	primary	 identity	upon	which	
we draw. “Choosing Scotland’s Future” asserts that Scots have ‘an 
acknowledged	political	and	institutional	identity’	but	never	attempts	
to	convince	us	that	this	is	a	single	identity	and	why	it	should	be	given	
priority	in	deciding	our	future.44
Further, the resurrection of the crucified Christ that unfolds into 
the	boundary-breaking	outpouring	of	the	Spirit	profoundly	questions	
the	 statements	 that	 are	 explicit	 and	 implicit	 in	 drawing	 boundaries	
between	 ‘Scottish’	 and	 ‘not-Scottish’.	 Again,	 this	 does	 not	 annul	
national	 identity	 per se	 but	 it	 interrogates	 what	 choosing	 to	 assert	
Scottish	 nationalism	means	 at	 the	 level	 of	 inter-personal	 relations.	
Although	much	of	the	nationalist	debate	can	be	framed	with	reference	
to	 ‘the	 English	 state’	 or	 the	 ‘Westminster	 Parliament’	 we	 are	 not	
thereby	absolved	from	taking	into	consideration	our	message	as	people	
in	Scotland	to	actual	people	in	England,	Wales,	or	Northern	Ireland.	
We	do	not	 thereby	concede	a	veto	 to	each	 individual	 in	 the	United	
Kingdom	but	we	are	not	to	neglect	the	human	dimension.45
Moltmann	argues	 that	God’s	 liberation	of	us	 from	 the	prison	of	
sin,	law	and	death	calls	for	something	to	correspond	to	it	in	political	
life,	what	he	calls	‘parables	of	the	freedom	of	faith’.46	His	typology	
of	‘vicious	circles	of	death’	concretises	those	situations	in	which	we	
ought	 to	 look	for	(and	work	for)	 liberation.	These	are	 the	circles	of	
poverty,	force,	racial	and	cultural	alienation,	 the	industrial	pollution	
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of	nature,	 and	of	 senselessness	 and	godforsakenness.47	Whilst	 there	
may be potential for refining the precise labels, it is in its capacity to 
facilitate	or	hinder	liberation	in	these	vicious	circles	(and	not	just	in	
Scotland)	that	Scottish	national	independence	ought	to	be	evaluated.	
Conclusion	
Here	I	return	to	my	earlier	discussion	that	found	Scottish	independence	
politically	and	ethically	 inadequate.	Castells’	 attention	 to	a	network 
society	 and	network-states	 tells	us	 that,	 at	 least	 to	 some	extent,	 the	
rules	 of	 the	 game	 have	 changed.	 Scottish	 independence	 must	 be	
justified in terms of its contribution to overcoming the circles of death; 
and	not	just	because	this	is	politically	expedient	but,	as	I	hope	I	have	
shown	 via	Moltmann’s	 presentation	 of	 the	 political	 implications	 of	
the crucified God, on theological terms. John Paul II’s articulation 
of	personalism	in	which	participation	is	critically	important	requires	
us	to	locate	the	ethical	value	of	Scottish	independence	in	those	who	
action it. Independence is dignified to the extent that the dignity of 
those who practice it (and live within it) is affirmed. Crucially, that 
dignity	is	inextricably	bound	up	with	how	we	dignify	other	people.	
In	 framing	 the	 National	 Conversation,	 “Choosing	 Scotland’s	
Future” can appear to resonate with the liberative values for which I 
have	been	arguing.	Section	2	is	an	interesting	example	where	it	makes	
claims	 for	 decision-making	 on	 pragmatic	 grounds	 for	 ‘a	 wealthier	
Scotland’,	‘a	safer	Scotland’,	‘a	fairer	Scotland’,	‘a	healthier	Scotland’,	
‘a	greener	Scotland’,	‘a	smarter	Scotland’,	and	‘a	stronger	Scotland’.	
However,	we	must	ask	a	more	 fundamental	question	of	 these	goals	
–	to	what	extent	will	they	enable	authentic	participation	(of	the	sort	
John	Paul	 II’s	 personalism	points	 us	 towards)?	The	goals	might	 be	
achievable	by	some	people	‘working	together’	but,	whilst	I	would	not	
want	to	set	objective	improvements	in	social	conditions	at	odds	with	
the	practice	of	‘participation’,	I	do	suggest	that	this	profound	ethical	
dimension	needs	to	be	made	more	visible.	Our	context	is	one	of	facing	
an	 imminent	 choice	 and	Scottish	 independence	must	make	 its	 case	
for	 change	 to	 the	 constitutional	 settlement	 on	 political,	 ethical	 and	
theological	grounds	of	authentic	participative	liberation,	not	identity.
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